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Executive Summary
The Multi-Jurisdictional Disclosure System (“MJDS”) offers significant savings to
Canadian issuers that use it (“Canadian MJDS Issuers”). Our cost benefit analysis
reveals that the Net Present Value of aggregate cost savings to Canadian MJDS Issuers
from (a) using Forms F-9 and F-10 for U.S. public offerings; (b) using MJDS forms for
meeting U.S. continuous disclosure obligations; and (c) minimizing lost “windows of
opportunities”, ranges from US$1.6 billion to US$3 billion over a ten year period,
assuming a discount rate of 7%.
We find that the main savings of MJDS remain intact despite the fact that Canadian
MJDS Issuers are being required to comply with the requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 (“SOX”).
The OSC’s Initiatives1 will not impose additional costs on reporting issuers in Ontario
that are using MJDS and complying with SOX requirements to the extent that the OSC’s
Initiatives conform to those SOX requirements.
The Net Present Value of the external professional fees paid by Canadian issuers with
securities listed in the U.S. to comply with SOX requirements is estimated at U.S.$683
million over a ten-year period, using a discount rate of seven percent. If Canadian issuers
listed in the U.S. were exempted from compliance with SOX requirements by the SEC
and could instead comply with comparable Canadian requirements that conform to SOX
requirements, this amount would drop to approximately U.S.$410 million, resulting in
savings of approximately U.S.$273 million.

1

The OSC Initiatives refer to the new rules that are expected to be released by the OSC in respect of (i)
CEO/CFO certifications of internal controls and procedures; (ii) CEO/CFO certification of financial
statements; and (iii) the composition, functioning and responsibilities of audit committees, as described in
more detail in Part 5 of this report.
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1. Introduction
We are pleased to submit this report entitled, “A Cost-Benefit Analysis of the MultiJurisdictional Disclosure System” to the Ontario Securities Commission (“OSC”).
SOX and the OSC’s Initiatives raise important issues about the net benefit of MJDS
going forward. In Part 2 of this report, we analyze the costs and benefits of MJDS. In
Part 3, we assess the impact of SOX requirements on Canadian Eligible MJDS Issuers
and the implications on cost savings from MJDS. In Part 4, we analyze the impact of
OSC’s Initiatives on Canadian MJDS Issuers, under the assumption that such initiatives
maintain conformity to SOX. We also assess the impact of the OSC’s Initiatives not
conforming to SOX.
During the course of our analysis, we conducted numerous interviews with relevant
stakeholders: (a) three Canadian MJDS Issuers; (b) senior securities lawyers at five
Canadian law firms and six U.S. law firms that represent Canadian MJDS Issuers; (c)
senior partners at an international accounting firm; and (d) one investment bank. We also
met with senior staff at the OSC and at the Toronto Stock Exchange (“TSX”).
Confidential information that was provided to us by the stakeholders was used to develop
the simple cost-benefit analysis that is presented in this report.
2. Principles of Securities Regulation
The purpose of securities law is to maintain investor confidence in the marketplace and to
enhance the efficiency of capital markets.2 Given the increasingly global nature of capital
markets, securities laws should be designed so as to retain and attract capital to Ontario.3

2

The Securities Act (Ontario) R.S.O. 1990, CHAPTER S.5, s 1.1 states the purposes of the act are: “(a) to
provide protection to investors from unfair, improper or fraudulent practices; and (b) to foster fair and
efficient capital markets and confidence in capital markets.”
3

The Five Year Review Committee Draft Report – Reviewing the Securities Act (Ontario) recommended
that section 2.1 of the Securities Act (Ontario) be amended to direct the OSC to have regard to, inter alia,
the principal that “capital markets are international in character and it is desirable to maintain the
competitive position of Ontario's capital markets” in pursuing the objectives of the Securities Act (Ontario).
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3. Cost Benefit Analysis of MJDS
(a) Introduction
The MJDS was adopted in 1991 by the Canadian Securities Administrators ("CSA") and
the Securities and Exchange Commission of the United States ("SEC") to reduce
duplicative regulation and facilitate cross-border securities offerings by certain eligible
Canadian reporting issuers in U.S. capital markets and certain eligible U.S. reporting
issuers in Canadian capital markets.4 The MJDS is a system of mutual recognition that
allows Canadian and U.S. issuers to carry on inter-jurisdictional securities activity with
greater efficiency and reduced transactions costs.
The MJDS operates on the basis that the underlying principles and policies and the
overall practices and substantive standards of securities regulation in Canada and the U.S.
are substantially similar.
Under MJDS, eligible Canadian issuers can offer securities to the public in the U.S. using
a prospectus prepared in accordance with Canadian standards. The document is filed with
and reviewed by the applicable Canadian securities regulator(s). It is also filed with the
SEC. A Canadian issuer is eligible to use MJDS Form F-9 to make a public offering in
the U.S. of investment grade debt and preferred stock if it has a twelve-month reporting
history in Canada; if the securities are convertible after one year, the issuer must also
have a public float of U.S.$75 million. A Canadian issuer is eligible to use MJDS Form
F-10 to make public offerings of any security in the U.S. if it has a market capitalization
of U.S.$75 million and a twelve-month reporting history in Canada.
Under MJDS, eligible Canadian issuers can fulfill their continuous disclosure
requirements under the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by filing their Canadian
continuous disclosure documents with the SEC. Canadian MJDS Issuers may file their
Canadian Annual Information Form (“AIF”), Management Discussion and Analysis
(“MD&A”) and Canadian GAAP financial statements (reconciled to U.S. GAAP) on
Form 40-F. The SEC does not generally review Form 40-F. Canadian issuers that are
ineligible to use MJDS are required to file continuous disclosure documents as foreign
private issuers using Form 20-F or as U.S. domestic issuers using Form 10-K, both of
which are reviewable by the SEC.

4

See National Policy No. 45 “Multijurisdictional Disclosure System” (1991) 14 O.S.C.B. 2867, National
Instrument 71-101, Companion Policy 71-101CP, Rule 71-801, and Form 71-101F1. See also
Multijurisdictional Disclosure and Modifications to the Current Registration and Reporting System for
Canadian Issuers, Release No. 33-6902, 56 Fed. Reg. 30036, [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) paragraph 84, 812, at 81,860 (July 1, 1991); See also Release No. 33-6879 and Release No. 337025.
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As a result of MJDS, the substantive disclosure required for both public offerings and
continuous disclosure by Canadian MJDS Issuers (other than the requirement to provide a
reconciliation describing material differences between Canadian GAAP and U.S. GAAP
financial statements) are determined by Canadian laws and regulations rather than SEC
rules.
Eligible Canadian issuers can also use MJDS for rights offerings (Form F-7) and
exchange offerings (Form F-8). Due to the greater frequency with which Form F-9 and
Form F-10 are used by Canadian issuers, the analysis in this report focuses on these
forms and does not analyze the cost savings associated with Form F-7 and Form F-8. In
this regard, the conclusions we reach with respect to MJDS savings are limited to those
realized from the use of Form F-9 and Form F-10.
(b) Use of MJDS By Canadian Issuers
This section of the report identifies the main uses and savings of MJDS by the Canadian
MJDS Issuers that use Forms F-9 and F-10.
(i) Public Offerings
From 1991 to 2002, Canadian MJDS Issuers used Form F-9 for 105 public offerings and
Form F-10 for 224 public offerings.5
MJDS provides significant benefits to eligible Canadian issuers conducting public
offerings in the U.S. There was unanimous agreement amongst all stakeholders we
interviewed that a Canadian issuer ought to use MJDS for a public offering if it is eligible
to do so.
Canadian issuers that are not eligible to use Form F-9 or Form F-10 for public offerings
because they do not meet the relevant thresholds of market capitalization and/or reporting
history must comply with the requirements applicable to foreign private issuers or U.S.
domestic issuers.
The benefits of MJDS use by Canadian MJDS Issuers are set out below.
- Canadian Regulatory Requirements May Allow for Incorporation by Reference
A Canadian MJDS Eligible Issuer can use a short form prospectus under the Prompt
Offering Qualification System (the “POP System”) to complete a public offering of
securities in the U.S. A short form prospectus allows many items to be incorporated by
reference which can result in significant cost savings. However, in MJDS transactions the
disclosure in a Canadian short form prospectus is often substantially enhanced so that the
offering document that is prepared, contains disclosure that is similar to that prepared for
5

Data obtained from Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison’s annual MJDS update (current to
December 31, 2002) available at http://www.paulweiss.com/db30/cgi-bin/pubs/MJDS%20Tables.pdf (last
viewed May 17, 2003).
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U.S. domestic issuers. This is done to address potential liability issues and marketing
opportunities in the U.S. The resulting document is known as a “short-form/long-form,”
implying short-form for Canadian regulatory purposes, but long-form for U.S. marketing
and liability purposes. As a result, the disclosure-related savings that MJDS offers in the
context of a U.S. public offering is in many cases not substantial.6
- Absence of SEC Review
The primary aspect of MJDS savings at the offering stage is the absence of SEC review.
In Ontario, a short form issuer can often receive initial comments from a Canadian
regulator within three to five days and in many cases obtain a final receipt in less than
two weeks. In comparison, the SEC takes 30 days for initial comments and five days for
subsequent comments. It is important to note that the SEC does not review all registration
statements. The SEC may decide that certain issuers warrant “no review” or only a
“limited review” of certain aspects of their offering documents. However, lawyers we
interviewed consistently indicated that a full review by the SEC could take a total of six
to twelve weeks to obtain final clearance. As a result, the SEC review process can be
significantly longer than a corresponding MJDS review process conducted by Canadian
securities regulators.
The benefits of being reviewed by the Canadian regulator(s) rather than the SEC under
MJDS can be broken down into two components, each of which is discussed below.
(1) Windows of Opportunity
The first benefit of being reviewed by Canadian regulator(s) rather than the SEC under
MJDS relates to the shorter time frame and certainty with which a public offering can be
made. The potentially longer SEC review increases the risk that a change in market
conditions may prevent the issuer from taking advantage of the “window of opportunity”
to raise capital on favourable terms. The shorter review time achieved by Canadian
regulators allows an issuer to better estimate its cost of capital and exposes it to a lower
risk of negative changes in issuer specific conditions or general market, economic or
political conditions.
For example, if interest rates rise during the period of SEC review, an issuer planning to
do a debt offering may find itself faced with a higher cost of capital which may require it
to borrow less capital than initially planned or borrow capital at a higher net cost.
Alternatively, if an issuer’s share price falls or the market declines dramatically during
the period of SEC review, an issuer planning on doing an equity offering may need to
issue more shares to raise the same amount of capital, resulting in greater dilution of
existing shares.
6

Note that some lawyers we interviewed indicated that even for a Canadian newly MJDS Eligible Issuer,
the short-form/long-form MJDS prospectus was significantly shorter than a U.S. domestic issuer’s longform offering document. To the extent that the short-form long-form MJDS prospectus may be
significantly shorter in some instances, the analysis in this report understates the savings associated with
MJDS.
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(2) Savings in Professional Fees
Being reviewed by Canadian regulator(s) rather than the SEC under MJDS can also result
in significant cost savings in respect of professional fees.
- Legal Fees
Canadian issuers that wish to access public capital markets in the U.S. must retain both
Canadian and U.S. legal counsel. When a Canadian issuer utilizes MJDS to conduct a
U.S. public offering, Canadian legal counsel often prepares the prospectus according to
Canadian regulatory requirements. If the issuer is advised to do so by its underwriter for
U.S. marketing purposes, U.S. legal counsel adds to the disclosure to make it “look like”
a U.S. offering document.
When a Canadian issuer conducts a U.S. public offering as a foreign private issuer or as a
U.S. domestic issuer, U.S. legal counsel takes primary responsibility for drafting the U.S.
offering document; Canadian legal counsel, often times, plays a secondary role.
For the purpose of analyzing the costs and benefits of MJDS in this study, we have
assumed that the costs of Canadian legal counsel fees are constant whether or not a
Canadian issuer uses MJDS and therefore are netted out in a cost benefit analysis.7 As a
result, our analysis below focuses on savings to Canadian issuers of U.S. legal counsel
fees from using MJDS.
Legal fees differ by issuer type, and in conducting our analysis, we devised three broad
scenarios:8 (a) a U.S. equity initial public offering (“IPO”) by a Canadian issuer that is
not MJDS eligible; (b) a U.S. equity IPO by a Canadian issuer that just meets MJDS
requirements for filing on Form F-10; and (c) a U.S. public equity offering on Form F-10
by a seasoned Canadian MJDS Eligible Issuer with a reporting history of at least 10
years. We asked U.S. lawyers what their average expected fees would be for each class
of issuer. Our results are summarized in Table 1 below.

7

Most Canadian lawyers that we interviewed indicated that Canadian legal counsel fees might sometimes
be higher when a Canadian issuer does not use MJDS to make a public offering in the U.S. We were
advised that Canadian legal counsel fees might increase because the process of SEC review often takes
longer than a comparable Canadian regulatory review and because Canadian legal counsel is still involved
in reviewing the documents and providing opinions. If this is true, then MJDS cost savings in this analysis
are understated.
8
Lawyers we interviewed indicated that U.S. legal counsel fees for Form F-9 offerings are often the same
or greater than those for Form F-10 offerings. As a result, the analysis in this report uses U.S. legal counsel
fees for Form F-10 filings as the basis for calculating the aggregate cost savings associated with use of both
Form F-9 and Form F-10.
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Table 1
U.S. Counsel Legal Fees
(a) U.S. Equity IPO by a (b) U.S. Equity IPO by a (c) U.S. Public Equity
newly-MJDS Offering by a Seasoned
Canadian Issuer that is not Canadian
Canadian MJDS Eligible
Eligible Issuer (Form F-10)
MJDS Eligible
Issuer (Form F-10)
U.S.$300,000-U.S.$500,000

U.S.$200,000-U.S.$350,000

U.S.$100,000-U.S.$250,000

A key reason why a Canadian issuer that is not MJDS eligible would on average incur
higher U.S. legal counsel fees than a Canadian MJDS Eligible Issuer is because of the
benefits associated with the absence of SEC review. The difference represents U.S. legal
counsel fees that would otherwise be incurred in addressing the SEC’s comments in the
absence of MJDS.
A comparison of a Canadian issuer’s U.S. counsel legal fees under the first and second
scenarios above reveals some information on the savings in U.S. legal counsel fees from
not having an SEC review. This is because the issuer’s characteristics are relatively
similar under both these scenarios, making it unnecessary to control for them. As Table 1
reveals, our research suggests a range of U.S.$300,000 to U.S.$500,000 for the first
scenario and a range of U.S.$200,000 to U.S.$350,000 for the second scenario. These
figures suggest that in the absence of MJDS, when a Canadian issuer would be subject to
full review by the SEC, such issuer’s U.S. legal counsel’s fees would be approximately
150% more than under the MJDS.
In order to test the accuracy of this result, we used another method to quantify savings in
U.S. legal counsel fees. Since the SEC generally takes thirty days to provide initial
comments on an issuer’s offering document, there ought to be only minimal legal fees
incurred during that thirty day time period. Deducting this time from the six to twelve
week range that is needed on average to complete SEC review leaves us with
approximately two to eight weeks during which U.S. legal counsel is addressing
comments as compared to the three days to two weeks that Canadian regulators would
take under MJDS. Post receipt of initial comments from the SEC, the regulatory
approval process is still four times longer in the absence of MJDS.
A reasonable assumption would be that U.S. legal counsel would work as intensively on a
per day basis during the two to eight week period as it would during the shorter MJDS
time period of three days to two weeks. However, we adopt a more conservative
approach of assuming that SEC review results in an eighty percent per day workload
relative to a similar process under MJDS. This implies that SEC review results in
Canadian issuers incurring roughly three times more in U.S. legal counsel fees as

9

compared to MJDS (4 times longer process after initial comments are received by the
regulators x 80%).
As a result, we conclude that, on average, a Canadian issuer’s U.S. legal counsel fees
would be one and a half to three times higher if MJDS did not exist or were eliminated.
- Accounting Fees
We have found that MJDS savings in respect of accounting and auditing fees are not
substantial. Canadian MJDS Issuers using MJDS Forms F-9 and F-10 do not need to
prepare U.S. GAAP financial statements when doing public offerings in the U.S. They
can use their Canadian GAAP financial statements but must prepare a reconciliation with
U.S. GAAP. Since this benefit is also available to Canadian issuers that are foreign
private issuers, it was not taken into account in our cost benefit analysis. We were
advised that the cost of auditing financial statements (which includes an audit of the U.S.
GAAP reconciliation statement) could be significant. However, this cost also does not
factor into our cost benefit analysis because it is a cost incurred by Canadian issuers
using MJDS as well as Canadian issuers that are foreign private issuers.
It is important to highlight however that Canadian MJDS Issuers that issue nonconvertible preferred stock or investment grade debt on Form F-9 are relieved of the
requirement to prepare an audited U.S. GAAP reconciliation. To the extent that this
benefit has not been quantified, MJDS savings have been understated in this analysis.
There are at least three accounting differences for a Canadian MJDS Eligible Issuer as
compared to a Canadian foreign private issuer that may result in MJDS savings. First,
foreign private issuers must report one additional year of Income Statement and
Statement of Cash Flow numbers as compared to Canadian MJDS Issuers. However, the
cost of this additional reporting is negligible.
Second, MJDS allows a Canadian MJDS Eligible Issuer’s Canadian GAAP financial
statements (including the reconciliation to U.S. GAAP) to be audited in accordance with
Canadian GAAS whereas a foreign private issuer must use U.S. GAAS. U.S. GAAS has
different standards than Canadian GAAS. For example, U.S. GAAS requires an
engagement letter and a representation letter signed by management while Canadian
GAAS does not impose such requirements. Another example is that U.S. and Canadian
G.A.A.S. have different standards for fraud. We understand from our interviews that
many of the large accounting firms appear to use the U.S. GAAS standards as best
practices with which they voluntarily comply. As a result of different standards imposed
by U.S. GAAS, there is an incremental cost associated in moving from a Canadian
GAAS audit under MJDS to a U.S. GAAS audit as a foreign private issuer.
A final savings for a Canadian issuer conducting a public offering using the MJDS in
contrast to a Canadian issuer conducting an offering as a foreign private issuer is that the
financial statements for the former are not generally reviewed by the SEC whereas they
are generally reviewable for foreign private issuers.
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- Printer Fees
The savings in printer fees under MJDS are not significant. As discussed above, a
Canadian MJDS Eligible Issuer is entitled to use a Canadian short form prospectus that
can be very short because it incorporates many items by reference. However, a Canadian
MJDS Eligible Issuer often adds disclosure to its prospectus resulting in a document that
is very similar to a U.S. style long-form offering document, as would be the case in the
absence of MJDS. Hence, the savings in printer fees savings are not significant.
- Underwriting Fees
Because investment dealers’ fees are based on a percentage of the size of an issuer’s
offering (as opposed to legal and accounting fees that are generally based on hourly
rates), there are no significant savings in terms of dealer fees associated with using
MJDS.
- Regulator Fees
We ignore differences in fees charged by regulators in our cost benefit analysis. Because
the SEC charges Canadian MJDS Issuers the same fees for filing Canadian disclosure
documents under MJDS as it would a Canadian issuer filing as a foreign private issuer or
U.S. domestic issuer, Canadian MJDS Issuers receive no cost savings in this regard. In
effect, SEC fees are charged for filing documents, not for reviewing them. Since the OSC
has recently moved to a fee structure that is based more on yearly maintenance as
opposed to per-transaction, the analysis does not take into account differences in OSC
fees.
(ii) Continuous Disclosure
MJDS is also used by Canadian MJDS Issuers to satisfy their U.S. continuous disclosure
obligations. As at December 31, 2002, there were a total of 202 Canadian issuers listed
on the New York Stock Exchange, NASDAQ or the American Stock Exchange (see
Table 2). Of Canadian issuers that filed annual disclosure documents in 2002, 45% used
the MJDS Form 40-F, 33% filed Form 20-Fs as foreign private issuers and 22% filed
Form 10-Ks as domestic issuers.9

TABLE 2
ANNUAL DISCLOSURE FILINGS

9

Data for Table 2 was compiled from Paul, Weiss Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison’s annual MJDS update
(current to December 31 2002) available at http://www.paulweiss.com/db30/cgibin/pubs/MJDS%20Tables.pdf (last viewed May 17, 2003).
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BY CANADIAN ISSUERS10
As at December 31, 2002
MJDS Issuer
Total
Number of Form 40-F
Canadian
Issuers
New York Stock 82
55
Exchange
NASDAQ
88
27
American Stock 32
5
Exchange
Total
202
87

Stock Exchange

Foreign Private U.S. Domestic
Issuer
Issuer
Form 10-K
Form 20-F
9

12

37
17

23
8

63

43

Both legal rules and market pressures influence the method by which Canadian issuers
meet their U.S. continuous disclosure obligations. Certain Canadian issuers that filed as
foreign private issuers using Form 20-F may not have met the eligibility criteria for
MJDS so as to use MJDS Form 40-F. Other Canadian issuers did not meet the definition
of foreign private issuer and thus had to meet their continuous disclosure obligations
using U.S. domestic issuer Form 10-K.
Interviews with stakeholders indicate that despite being eligible to use MJDS Form 40-F,
many eligible Canadian MJDS Issuers “voluntarily file” foreign private issuer Form 20-F
or U.S. domestic issuer Form 10-K. This is often because they want to provide
information that is comparable to U.S. domestic issuers, and “look like” U.S. domestic
issuers. Since competitors may be based in the U.S. and file as U.S. domestic issuers,
they want to make it as easy as possible for U.S. research analysts to follow their stock.
On the other hand, we were also told that many eligible Canadian MJDS Issuers that
consider themselves “North American” or “World Class” issuers have a clear preference
to use the MJDS Form 40-F expressly because it is not generally reviewed by the SEC.
The savings in U.S. counsel legal fees associated with using MJDS forms for annual
disclosure as opposed to foreign private issuer forms or domestic issuer forms are not
substantial. Interviews with U.S. lawyers indicate that U.S. counsel legal fees for filing
MJDS Form 40-F are in the range of U.S.$1,000 to U.S.$10,000, as compared to
U.S.$7500 to U.S.$12,000 for filing a Form 20-F as a foreign private issuer or Form 10-K
as a U.S. domestic issuer.
The savings in accounting fees that were discussed earlier with respect to offerings are
also relevant in the context of continuous disclosure obligations. The most important
difference between filing an MJDS Form 40-F as opposed to a foreign private issuer
Form 20-F or U.S. domestic issuer Form 10-K is that the first form is not generally
reviewable by the SEC while the latter two forms are.
10

The sum of columns 3, 4 and 5 do not equal column 2 because some Canadian issuers do not appear to
have filed in 2002. Id.
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(c) Expanded Cost Benefit Analysis
The above discussion lays the foundation for the cost benefit analysis of MJDS. The cost
benefit analysis proceeds from fundamental and widely accepted principles of public
economics analysis.
In calculating costs and benefits of MJDS, the party that our analysis focuses on is
Canadian issuers that use (a) MJDS Form F-9 for U.S. public offerings of preferred stock
and investment grade debt; and (b) MJDS Form F-10 for other U.S. public securities
offerings.
Canadian issuers receive the same benefits from raising capital in U.S. public markets
whether or not they employ MJDS. The relevant savings for Canadian issuers from
MJDS stem from cost differences. Or
•

Benefits = CostsNONMJDS – CostsMJDS

•

Where CostsNONMJDS = Total Costs of Issuers in a Non-MJDS Scenario

•

CostsMJDS = Total Costs of Issuers in a MJDS Scenario

We know that:
•

CostsNONMJDS = Legal Costs NONMJDS + Accounting Costs NONMJDS +

Underwriter FeesNONMJDS + Printing Costs NONMJDS
Similarly:
•

CostsMJDS = Legal Costs MJDS + Accounting Costs MJDS + Underwriter Fees MJDS
+ Printing Costs MJDS

As elaborated above, there is little difference in accounting costs, underwriter fees, and
printing costs between MJDS and non-MJDS scenarios. Instead significant cost
differences arise from the variation in U.S. legal counsel fees from both the review and
disclosure processes. Or using the above notation:
•

Benefits = CostsNONMJDS – CostsMJDS = Legal CostsNONMJDS – Legal CostsMJDS

13

Cost Savings from U.S. Legal Counsel Fees associated with MJDS Forms F-9 and F-10
We calculate costs savings separately for (a) a newly eligible Canadian MJDS Issuer and
a (b) seasoned Canadian MJDS Issuer. Within this classification, cost savings with
respect to not having an SEC review are estimated by taking the difference between the
upper and lower bounds of the issuer’s U.S. counsel’s legal fees charged under MJDS
detailed above, and the upper and lower bounds generated by our assumption that legal
fees under a non-MJDS scenario should be between one and a half to three times higher.
For example, for a type (a) issuer, U.S. legal counsel’s fees have been estimated to be
between U.S.$200,000 to U.S.$350,000 under MJDS. If we assume that fees are one and
a half times higher in a non-MJDS scenario, then a Canadian issuer’s U.S. legal counsel
fees should be between U.S.$300,000 to U.S.$525,000. Cost savings under MJDS then
range between U.S.$100,000 (U.S.$300,000-U.S.$200,000) to U.S.$175,000
(U.S.$525,000–U.S.$350,000).
Using similar methodology, we obtain a cost savings of U.S.$400,000 (U.S.$600,000U.S.$200,000) to U.S.$700,000 (U.S.$1,050,000–U.S.$350,000) for a type (a) issuer
assuming a three times cost difference. Hence, cost savings for type (a) issuers under
MJDS range from U.S.$100,000 to U.S.$700,000, assuming that legal fees under a nonMJDS scenario should be between one and a half to three times higher.
For a type (b) issuer, the issuer’s U.S. legal counsel fees have been estimated to be
between U.S.$100,000 to U.S.$250,000 using MJDS. If fees are one and a half times
higher in a non-MJDS scenario, then fees should be U.S.$150,000 to U.S.$375,000. Cost
savings under MJDS are then between U.S.$50,000 (U.S.$150,000-U.S.$100,000) to U.S.
$125,000 (U.S.$375,000–U.S.$250,000). Using similar methodology, we obtain a cost
savings of between U.S.$200,000 (U.S.$300,000–U.S.$100,000) to U.S$500,000
(U.S.$750,000-U.S.$250,000) for a type (b) issuer assuming a three times cost
difference.11 Consequently, cost savings for type (b) issuers under MJDS range from
U.S.$50,000 to U.S.$500,000, assuming that legal fees under a non-MJDS scenario are
between one and a half to three times higher.
The next step is to calculate these costs and cost savings on an aggregate basis, which
requires taking into account the total number of Canadian MJDS Issuers. Canadian MJDS
Issuers used Form F-9 for public offerings in the U.S. 12 times on an average annual
basis in each of 1999, 2001 and 2002. Similarly, during the same time period, Canadian
MJDS Issuers used Form F-10 on average for 20 issuances per year.

11

The analysis for type (b) issuers assumes that the SEC will engage in a full review of an issuer’s offering
documents if it makes a public offering as a foreign private issuer or as a U.S. domestic issuer. However,
the SEC does not review all offering documents. It is possible that, in the absence of MJDS, the SEC may
decide that certain seasoned issuers warrant “no review” or “limited review” in which case the cost savings
of MJDS would be less than noted above. A more complex model would factor in the probability of SEC
review.
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Assuming that all these issuers were type (a), then savings benefits from MJDS to
Canadian MJDS Issuers on an annual basis are between U.S.$3,200,000 ((20 + 12) x
U.S.$100,000) to U.S.$22,400,000 ((20 + 12) x U.S.$700,000). However, if we assume
that all of these issuers were type (b), then savings from MJDS to Canadian MJDS
Issuers annually are between U.S.$1,600,000 ((20 + 12) x U.S.$50,000) and
U.S.$16,000,000 ((20 + 12) x U.S.$500,000).
Hence, in aggregate, MJDS has resulted in cost savings of between U.S.$1,600,000 to
U.S.$22,400,000 to Canadian MJDS Issuers on an annual basis for public offerings on
Forms F-9 and F-10.
Cost Savings in U.S. Counsel Legal Fees associated with MJDS Form 40-F
With respect to continuous disclosure savings for MJDS Form 40-F, our research
indicates, as noted above, that for both issuer types (a) and (b), U.S. legal counsel fees
under MJDS can run between U.S.$1,000 to U.S.$10,000, while in a non-MJDS scenario,
corresponding costs are between U.S.$7,500 to U.S.$12,000. Therefore, cost differences
are between U.S.$2,000 (U.S.$12,000 – U.S.$10,000) to U.S.$6,500 (U.S.$7,500U.S.$1,000).
With respect to continuous disclosure, available data reveals that on average, 87
Canadian MJDS Issuers used MJDS Form 40-F in 2002 to satisfy their U.S. annual
disclosure obligations. Therefore, costs savings for annual disclosure filings for Canadian
MJDS Issuers are between U.S.$174,000 (87 x U.S.$2,000) to U.S.$565,500 (87 x
U.S.$6,500) on an annual basis.
Cost Savings in respect of Windows of Opportunity
As discussed above, Canadian regulatory review ranges on average from three days to
two weeks while a corresponding SEC process can take, on average, between six to
twelve weeks. Hence, on average, Canadian MJDS Issuers can shorten the regulatory
review process significantly (five and a half to ten weeks), and thus minimize possible
losses from missed windows of opportunity for favourable financing.
One method to quantify MJDS cost savings from a shorter regulatory review process is
by assuming that the longer the review process takes, the greater the issuer’s opportunity
cost as represented by a proportionate decline in share prices.
Hence, we examined monthly trends in the TSE/S&P index for 2001 and 2002. Available
data suggests that the index declined by an average of 1.7% per month during this time
period. If MJDS saves Canadian issuers between five and a half to ten weeks then it also
prevents, on average, between a 2.3375% (1.375 months x 1.7%) to a 4.25% (2.5 months
x 1.7%) decline in average share prices.
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Available data indicates that Canadian MJDS Issuers made 16 equity public offerings in
the U.S., on average, in each of 2001 and 2002, for an average value of approximately
U.S.$569 million.
Assuming a constant number of shares, a Canadian MJDS Issuer that employed MJDS to
make an equity public offering in the U.S. in 2001 and 2002 managed to avoid between a
U.S.$13,300,375 (2.3375/100 x U.S.$569 million) and U.S.$24,182,500 (4.25/100 x
U.S.$569 million) loss in share value due to potentially longer review by the SEC.12
On average, since there were 16 Canadian issuers that used MJDS to issue equity in each
of 2001 and 2002, aggregate MJDS savings for these Canadian issuers was
U.S.$212,806,000 (US $ 13,300,375 x 16) to U.S.$386,920,000 (US $24,182,500 x 16),
on an annual basis.
It should be noted that this analysis focuses on lost windows of opportunity during
market declines and does not assess the impact to issuers of market upswings while
waiting for regulatory approval. This is important as the above benefits may then be
netted out.
In Parts 4 and 5 of this report, we consider the impact of SOX and the OSC’s Initiatives
on the MJDS cost savings we have arrived at in this part of the report.

12

As noted in other parts of this report, if the SEC chose to conduct “No Review” of a certain issuer’s
offering documents, there would be no cost savings.
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4.The Impact of SOX on Canadian MJDS Issuers
The enactment of SOX in 2002 brought sweeping changes to U.S. securities laws. This
part first discusses SOX requirements as they apply to Canadian MJDS Issuers. We then
analyze the practical implications of these new requirements for Canadian MJDS Issuers,
and assess the implications of SOX on the cost benefit analysis of MJDS conducted in
Part 3 of this study. We conclude by analyzing the policy implications of SOX for the
continued existence of MJDS.
(a) SOX requirements as applied to Canadian MJDS Issuers
Notwithstanding the general principle that MJDS documents are governed by Canadian
laws and regulations and are reviewed by Canadian securities regulators, SOX contains
mandatory features that changes how Canadian MJDS Issuers prepare their disclosure
documents and potentially subjects Canadian MJDS Issuers to review by the SEC.
The effect of SOX requirements on Canadian MJDS Issuers will depend on how the
mandatory rules in SOX are interpreted and the substance of the rules that the SEC is
required to create with respect to SOX.
It is significant to note that SOX does not contain any general exemption for Canadian
MJDS Issuers or other foreign private issuers. As a general matter, the SEC has the
authority to create exemptions for Canadian MJDS Issuers and foreign private issuers.
It is uncertain whether the SEC will create exemptions for foreign private issuers
including Canadian MJDS Issuers from SOX requirements. However, the SEC’s Final
Rule on Disclosure in Management's Discussion and Analysis about Off-Balance Sheet
Arrangements and Aggregate Contractual Obligations released on January 27, 2003,
clearly states that it applies to foreign private issuers and Canadian MJDS Issuers:13
Application to Foreign Private Issuers
The amendments apply to foreign private issuers that file
annual reports on Form 20-F or on Form 40-F. Because Section
401(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act does not distinguish between
foreign private issuers and U.S. companies, we interpret
Congress' directive to the Commission to adopt rules requiring
expanded disclosure about off-balance sheet transactions in
annual reports filed with the Commission to apply equally to
Form 20-F or 40-F annual reports filed by foreign private
issuers and to Form 10-K or 10-KSB annual reports filed by
domestic issuers. … We do not believe that it is appropriate to
exempt foreign private issuers or MJDS filers because, as
discussed below, the disclosure requirements do not represent
13

Release No. 33-8182 (Jan. 28, 2003) [68 FR 5982] (Effective: April 7, 2003)
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a fundamental change in our approach with respect to the
financial disclosure provided by foreign private issuers and
MJDS filers.
There are two additional reasons for applying the amendments
to foreign private issuers' annual reports filed with the
Commission. First, investors and others would enjoy the same
benefits from expanded off-balance sheet disclosure in foreign
private issuers' annual reports as they would from this
disclosure in domestic issuers' annual reports. Second, for
Form 20-F annual reports, the existing MD&A-equivalent
requirements for foreign private issuers currently mirror the
substantive MD&A requirements for U.S. companies. We
believe this desirable policy should continue.
The disclosure provided by Canadian issuers that file Form 40F is generally that required under Canadian law. We have,
however, supplemented these disclosure requirements with
specific required items of information. We have adopted
additional disclosure requirements under Form 40-F as a result
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Although an issuer prepares its
MD&A discussion contained in a Form 40-F registration
statement or annual report in accordance with Canadian
disclosure standards, we believe that requiring disclosure of
off-balance sheet arrangements and a table of contractual
obligations in accordance with SEC rules is not inconsistent
with the principles of the MJDS, is consistent with the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and, most importantly, will provide
investors with useful information that is comparable to that
provided by U.S. and other foreign companies that file reports
under the Exchange Act. (Emphasis added.)
Nonetheless, it is possible that the SEC may grant exemptions for Canadian MJDS
Issuers and other foreign private issuers in respect of other provisions of SOX. We have
identified several provisions of SOX that are particularly relevant to Canadian MJDS
Issuers:
i. A mandate for the SEC to review filings every three years;
ii. Addition of substantive disclosure requirements to MJDS
continuous disclosure forms; and
iii. Corporate governance measures including CEO/CFO certifications
and institution of disclosure controls and procedures and other
changes in internal business practices.
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The cost implications of these provisions on Canadian MJDS Issuers are discussed in the
following section.
(b) Impact of SOX on MJDS Cost Savings
SOX requirements are focused on continuous disclosure and they increase the cost of
compliance with continuous disclosure requirements. Generally speaking, to the extent
that Canadian MJDS Issuers, foreign private issuers and U.S. domestic issuers are all
required to comply with SOX, the cost benefit analysis in Part 3 does not change since
the overall cost of continuous disclosure compliance has increased for all of them. This
conclusion is elaborated on below.
(i) Public Offerings
Generally speaking, SOX does not have a large impact on the cost of public offering
transactions in the U.S., be it for a Canadian MJDS Eligible Issuer, foreign private issuer,
or a U.S. domestic issuer.14 The absence of SEC review of listing and offering documents
under MJDS remains post-SOX and so this savings remains intact for Canadian MJDS
Issuers post-SOX.
(ii) SEC’s Review of Filings
Section 408 of SOX requires the SEC to review filings of issuers at least once every three
years. The benefits associated with the absence of SEC review of MJDS continuous
disclosure reports would change if the SEC decides to apply section 408 to Canadian
MJDS Issuers. If the SEC does not apply this provision to Canadian MJDS Issuers, the
savings associated with the absence of SEC review to such issuers could potentially
increase because the SEC is putting additional resources into continuous disclosure
review of other issuers.
To date, the SEC has not provided specific guidance on how it plans to interpret section
408 and whether it will review MJDS continuous disclosure forms filed by Canadian
MJDS Issuers.
In a letter to the SEC dated February 19, 2003, the CSA suggested that the SEC and
Canadian regulators explore the possibility of mutual reliance of reviews by regulators in
the other jurisdiction or joint reviews. The letter reads:
Continuous Disclosure Review
The CSA has established and continues to develop an increasingly
robust process for continuous disclosure review. For example,
some jurisdictions have a goal that issuers based in their
jurisdiction are subject to a continuous disclosure review once
14

One source of additional expense for public offerings by Canadian MJDS Issuers, foreign private issuers
and U.S. domestic issuers is with respect to disclosure of off-balance sheet transactions.
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every four years on average. To date, this goal has been met or
exceeded. Issuers that meet certain risk-based selection criteria are
reviewed much more often than once every four years; indeed,
some issuers are currently subject to “real time reviews”, under
which those issuers’ disclosures are monitored at the time they are
filed. Other jurisdictions do not have a fixed cycle of reviews but
do all reviews using a risk-based methodology. We believe that the
CSA’s continuous disclosure initiatives compare favourably to the
requirement contained in SOX that U.S. issuers be reviewed no
less frequently than once every three years.
Canadian Issuers that are U.S. registrants are subject to continuous
disclosure review by both Canadian and U.S. regulators. These
reviews can entail considerable duplication of effort. This
duplication will increase substantially as the review programs in
both our jurisdictions become more robust and comprehensive.
We would like to explore with the SEC the possibility of a protocol
that would enable Canadian securities regulators and the SEC to
rely on reviews conducted by the other, subject to appropriate
systems of oversight. Alternatively, we could explore the possibility
of a joint continuous disclosure review process of those issuers
that are inter-listed. The Ontario Securities Commission and the
SEC have, in the past, carried out joint reviews of Canadian
issuers that are U.S. registrants. The CSA would be happy to
discuss procedures for information sharing, joint reviewing,
consulting, and any other matters relevant to this objective.
(Emphasis added.)
We understand that, to date, the SEC has not clarified its position in this regard.
(iii) Corporate Governance Measures
With respect to corporate governance, SOX also imposes new business imperatives such
as CEO/CFO certification and disclosure controls and procedures and other changes in
internal business practices. However, these provisions are applicable equally to Canadian
MJDS Issuers, foreign private issuers, and U.S. domestic issuers.15 Because these costs
are imposed on all three classes of issuers, the cost savings associated with MJDS
analyzed in Part 3 are not affected.
(c) Costs of Compliance with SOX
SOX increases the costs of compliance for Canadian MJDS Issuers as well as Canadian
issuers that report as foreign private issuers and U.S. domestic issuers. The incremental
costs of compliance relate primarily to increases in: (a) external audit fees; (b) U.S. legal
15

However, note that CEO/CFO certification is not required for financial statements on MJDS Form 6-K.
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counsel fees; (c) directors’ and officers’ insurance premiums; and (d) increases in time
spent by directors, officers and staff in complying with SOX.
A survey conducted by U.S. law firm Foley & Lardner found that SOX has doubled the
cost of being a public company in the U.S. from U.S.$1.3 million to almost U.S.$2.5
million.16 Compliance with SOX is estimated at approximately U.S.$1.2 million, on
average, for a mid-sized public company. Their study was based on responses from 32
mostly mid-sized companies and a review of 328 proxy statements, as well as interviews
with accountants, insurers and public relations companies.
The study found that as a result of SOX, directors’ and officers’ insurance increased 94.2
percent from U.S.$329,000 to U.S.$639,000; accounting fees increased by 105 percent
from U.S.$243,000 to U.S.$499,000; legal fees increased by 90.6 percent from
U.S.$210,000 to U.S.$404,000; directors’ expected annual number of hours devoted to
board work almost doubled from an average of 125 to more than 200; and compliance
personnel costs increased by 268 percent.
We contacted several Canadian MJDS Issuers in order to estimate their costs of
compliance associated with SOX. However, very few issuers responded, and of those that
did, few were able to provide us with precise figures.
Our interviews with three Canadian MJDS Issuers suggest that they were of the view that
the internal costs of compliance with SOX are significant but that it is too early to
precisely indicate what those costs are. For example, many seasoned Canadian MJDS
Issuers have regulatory compliance departments that are responsible for matters such as
SOX. To the extent that employees in such departments have shifted their focus to
address SOX compliance or have added to their workload, many issuers found it difficult
to precisely measure the incremental costs associated with SOX compliance.
One issuer, a financial institution interlisted on the TSX and the NYSE, indicated that it
had incurred very little in the way of incremental costs. This issuer emphasized that much
of the compliance with SOX was accomplished through existing salaried personnel,
including Canadian and U.S. lawyers and accounting staff, and it was unable to provide
us with an estimate of hours spent by internal personnel. It indicated that they did not
incur significant increases in external U.S. legal counsel fees to date because they had a
U.S. lawyer on staff.
Another issuer, a large mining and metal company, interlisted on the TSX and the NYSE
also advised us that its costs of compliance with SOX has not been overwhelmingly
large. This issuer’s chief legal counsel indicated that it had incurred US$50,000 to
US$100,000 to date, comprised of increases in external auditor and U.S. legal counsel
fees and also to set up a whistleblower mechanism handled by an independent third party
provider.
16

Presentation by Lance Jon Kimmel & Steven Vanquez of Foley Lardner entitled “The Increased
Financial and Non-Financial Cost of Staying Public” at the National Directors Institute (Chicago: April,
2003)
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However, another issuer, a large financial institution, interlisted on the TSX and the
NYSE, with an international presence and U.S. subsidiaries, suggested that it was
incurring significant costs in complying with SOX. This issuer’s chief accountant
estimated its sunk or one-time costs to be over CDN$5 million. It was estimated that the
external auditor would spend 1,000 additional hours at a value of CDN$1 million, and
that internal accounting staff would spend 2,000 hours at a value of CDN$2 million. It
was estimated that compliance measures for each of the issuer’s divisions would total
over CDN$2 million. Annual increases in the external auditor’s fees were estimated at
CDN$500,000.
Given the rather wide range of values we obtained from our interview process, we
extrapolated average values of compliance with SOX from the Foley Lardner study. As
the study indicates, a mid-sized U.S. issuer experienced an increase of U.S.$256,000 in
accounting fees (from U.S.$243,000 to U.S.$499,000) and an increase of U.S.$194,000 in
legal fees (from U.S.$210,000 to U.S.$404,000), resulting in a total cost increase in
external professional fees in the amount of U.S.$450,000. We assume that these figures
also apply to Canadian issuers listed in the U.S.17 For the purpose of our analysis, we
focus on external accounting and legal fees, as these were the costs that were consistently
referred to by issuers we interviewed. As indicated earlier, Table 2 reveals that there are
a total of 202 Canadian issuers listed on the NYSE, NASDAQ and the American Stock
Exchange. Based on these assumptions, compliance with SOX has increased the fees paid
to external legal and accounting professionals by an aggregate of U.S.$90,900,000 (202 x
U.S.$450,000) for these Canadian issuers.
Would these Canadian issuers experience significant costs savings if the SEC exempted
them from compliance with requirements under SOX and allowed them to comply with
comparable Canadian requirements that conform to SOX?
One Canadian issuer indicated that its costs of compliance would have been fifty percent
less if it instead could have complied with Canadian rules that conform to SOX. If
Canadian MJDS Issuers (and other Canadian issuers currently required to comply with
SOX) were exempted by the SEC from SOX compliance and could instead comply with
Canadian regulatory standards that conform to SOX, it is possible that such issuers would
experience some level of cost savings. This would result from Canadian issuers being
able to hire external Canadian professional advisors as opposed to external U.S.
professional advisors whose billings would be approximately one-third less when the
exchange rate is taken into account. To the extent that comparable Canadian advisors
charge marginally less than their U.S. counterparts, there very well could be other savings
in addition to the thirty-three percent savings resulting from the exchange rate. While we
cannot with confidence conclude that there would be an overall fifty percent savings,
there is certainly a possibility that Canadian issuers’ costs of compliance would be
reduced significantly.

17

80% of the Foley Lardner’s survey responses were from companies with revenues under U.S.$1 billion
and 20% were from companies with revenues over U.S.$1 billion. The survey notes that “the costs for
larger mid-cap and S&P 500 companies will be proportionately more (3-5x ) higher in dollar terms”.
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This reasoning suggests that the figure of U.S.$90 million that we have indicated is the
aggregate cost of external professional fees paid by Canadian issuers currently required to
comply with SOX requirements could drop by at least thirty-three percent and likely to
more than forty percent if such issuers were instead able to comply with comparable
Canadian requirements that conform to SOX requirements. Using forty percent as the
estimated cost savings, we conclude that if Canadian issuers listed in the U.S. could
comply with Canadian requirements that conform to SOX requirements instead of
compliance with SOX requirements, their compliance costs would drop to
U.S.$54,540,000.
There is a risk at the margin that given the new SOX requirements, some Canadian
issuers, MJDS eligible or otherwise, may exit (or not access) U.S. public capital markets,
because in absolute terms, it has become too expensive. However, this is unlikely for
seasoned Canadian MJDS Issuers. Many of the increased cost of compliance with SOX
are one-time implementation costs and their significance should be considered on an ongoing basis. Internal compliance costs, external auditing fees and external U.S. counsel
legal fees to put internal business practices in place and get up the learning curve on new
corporate governance methods could be substantial up front, but when amortized over the
long run, they are not significant, especially for seasoned Canadian MJDS Issuers.
The next part of this report addresses the OSC’s Initiatives and the implications for
MJDS.
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5. The OSC’s Initiatives
Following the SEC’s lead with SOX, a number of significant amendments were made to
the Securities Act (Ontario).18 These amendments were proclaimed into force effective
April 7, 2003. The OSC now has the authority to require reporting issuers to appoint
audit committees and prescribe requirements on the functioning and responsibilities of
audit committees. The amended Securities Act (Ontario) also authorizes the OSC to
create rules with respect to CEO and CFO certification similar to those currently in effect
in the U.S. pursuant to SOX including certification of systems of internal control and
disclosure controls. The OSC has also been granted rule-making authority to prescribe
financial accounting, and reporting and auditing requirements. The OSC is in the process
of preparing draft rules to be released for comment with respect to this rule-making
authority.
This part of the report analyses the OSC’s Initiatives, their relationship to SOX and their
impact on MJDS. This part of the report also analyses the policy implications and
practical impact on Canadian MJDS Issuers, if provinces other than Ontario do not also
conform to SOX. Finally, this section analyses the implications for the cost benefit
analysis conducted in Parts 3 and 4 of this study.
(a) Effect of the OSC’s Initiatives on MJDS Savings
The OSC’s Initiatives will not significantly impact the cost of offerings to reporting
issuers in Ontario (whether Canadian MJDS Issuers or not) because neither SOX
requirements nor the OSC’s Initiatives focus on the offering stage. The cost savings of
MJDS associated with the absence of SEC review for offerings remain intact, irrespective
of whether the OSC’s Initiatives are implemented and whether or not they conform to
SOX.
The cost savings of MDJS associated with the absence of SEC review of MJDS Form 40F (subject to application of section 408 of SOX requiring SEC review at least every three
years) also remain intact, even if the OSC’s Initiatives are implemented and do not
conform exactly to SOX.
The OSC’s Initiatives with respect to corporate governance measures will impose
additional costs on all reporting issuers in Ontario that do not report in the U.S.
However, the OSC’s Initiatives will not impact reporting issuers in Ontario that are
Canadian MJDS Issuers, foreign private issuers or U.S domestic issuers, and are therefore
already subject to SOX so long as the OSC’s Initiatives conform exactly to SOX.

18

See amendments to the Securities Act (Ontario) in S.O. 2002, c.22, Keeping the Promise for a Strong
Economy Act (Budget Measures), 2002.
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Canadian MJDS Issuers that were interviewed for this study emphasized that the OSC
should conform its rules entirely to SOX. They suggested that any slight differences from
the SOX requirements with which they are required to comply would impose additional
costs on them. Several of such issuers indicated that if the OSC plans to even slightly
change its requirements from those in SOX, that reporting issuers in Ontario that are
eligible to use MJDS (or that must comply with SOX) be exempted from the OSC’s
Initiatives or, in the alternative, be permitted to file their SOX disclosures with the OSC.
(b) Impact on MJDS of Canadian Rules Conforming to SOX
As noted above, the short-term status of MJDS is that all pre-SOX Canadian MJDS
Issuers are entitled, post-SOX, to use MJDS for offerings and continuous disclosure so
long as they comply with SOX. This is irrespective of whether the OSC and/or the other
provincial securities commissions implement rules that conform to SOX. In the long run,
however, the greater the actual or perceived gap between Canadian and U.S. regulatory
standards, the greater the risk that MJDS could be eliminated. To this end, adoption of
rules nationally that conform to SOX will increase the probability of maintaining MJDS
and also obtaining a carve-out for Canadian issuers from SOX requirements.
Provinces that do not conform to SOX may experience capital flight, at the margin.
Empirical studies indicate that over time high quality issuers migrate to jurisdictions with
stronger investor protection regimes. These studies reveal that issuers that make credible
commitments to the market to observe higher standards of disclosure and corporate
governance experience lower costs of capital,19 greater liquidity,20 higher returns21 and
enhanced analyst coverage.22 Non-SOX conforming provinces could attempt to avoid net
19

See D.W. Diamond and R.E. Verrechia, “Disclosure, Liquidity and the Cost of Capital”, 46 J. Finance
(1991) 1325 (Finding a commitment to increased disclosure, which reduces information asymmetries,
produces lower costs of capital); C.B. Barry and S.J. Brown, “Limited Information as a Source of Risk”, 12
J. Portfolio Management 66. (Investors usually have less than perfect information on firm profitability, and
if this risk is non-diversifiable, investors will demand an incremental return for bearing information risk. As
a result, firms with high levels of disclosure and consequently low information risk are likely to have a
lower cost of capital than firms with low disclosure levels and high information risk.)
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O. Kim, & R. Verrechia, “Market Liquidity and Volume Around Earnings Announcements”, 17 Journal
of Accounting and Economics (1994) 41 (Finding that increased disclosure enhances stock liquidity); See
also S. Huddart, John Hughes and Markus Brunnermeier, “Disclosure Requirements and Stock Exchange
Listing Choice in an International Context”, (Working Paper, 1998)(Finding that exchanges competing for
trading volume engage in a “race for the top” under which disclosure requirements increase and trading
costs fall.)
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See P. Healy, H. Hutton, K. Palepu, “Stock Performance and Intermediation Changes Surrounding
Sustained Increases in Disclosure”, 16 Contemporary Accounting Research (1999) 485 (Finding that
issuers that produce greater disclosure experience significant contemporaneous increases in stock prices
that are unrelated to current earnings performance); See Stephen Foerster and G. Andrew Karolyi, “The
Effects of Market Segmentation and Investor Recognition on Asset Prices: Evidence from Foreign Stocks
Listing in the United States”, 54 J. Fin. 981 (Finding that firms cross-listing in the U.S. earn cumulative
abnormal returns of 19% in the year before listing).
22
C.A. Botosan, “Disclosure Level and The Cost of Equity Capital”, 72(3) Accounting Review (1997) 323
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capital flight (and possibly attract more capital) in the post SOX environment by
positioning themselves as niche players providing a more flexible, lenient market for
smaller, younger firms that are not ready to access the more mature Canadian and U.S.
markets. However, the benefits of a flexible and more lenient regulatory environment
could be offset by an increase in issuers’ cost of capital and reduced liquidity because of
the actual or perceived risks associated with such a marketplace.

(Finding that firms with low analyst coverage have a negative relation between the cost of equity capital
and the extent of their voluntary disclosures). C.A. Botosan and M.A. Plumlee, “A Re-Examination of
Disclosure Level and Expected Cost of Capital” (Working Paper, 2000) (Finding a negative cross-sectional
relation between cost of capital and analyst rankings of annual report disclosures).
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6. Summary of Cost Benefit Analysis
The tables below summarize our results and also provide corresponding Net Present
Values assuming 4%, 7%, and 10% discount rates over a 10-year period, which is typical
for a cost benefit analysis.

Table 3
Cost Savings From MJDS
(US $)(Over a Ten-Year Period)
Annual Figures
Lower
Upper
Bound
Bound

4% Discount Rate
Lower Bound
Upper Bound

7% Discount Rate
Lower Bound
Upper Bound

10% Discount Rate
Lower Bound
Upper Bound

(A) Aggregate
Cost Savings to
Canadian
MJDS Issuers
from using
Forms F-9 and
F-10 for U.S.
public offerings

1,600,000

22,400,000

13,496,531

188,951,428

12,024,372

168,341,202

10,814,438

151,402,133.5

(B) Aggregate
Cost Savings to
Canadian
MJDS Issuers
from using
MJDS annual
disclosure
forms

174,000

565,000

1,467,748

4,770,180

1,307,650,411

4,249,864

1,176,070

3,822,228

(C) Aggregate
Cost Savings to
Canadian
MJDS Issuers
from
minimization of
lost windows of
opportunity

212,860,000

386,920,000

1,795,544,687

3,263,798,507

1,599,692,336

2,907,793,662

1,438,725,810

2,615,201,495

TOTAL

214,634,000

409,885,500

1,810,508,965

3,457,520,115

1,613,024,358

3,080,384,728

1,450,716,318

2,770,425,856

TABLE 4
Expected Costs of External Professional Fees for Compliance with SOX
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and Canadian Rules that Conform to SOX
(US $) (Over a Ten-Year Period)
Annual Figures
(A) Aggregate
Costs of
External
Professional
Fees paid by
Canadian
Issuers listed in
the U.S. to
comply with
SOX

90,900,000

4% Discount
Rate
766,771,643

(B) Aggregate
Costs of
External
Professional
Fees that would
be paid by
Canadian
Issuers listed in
the U.S.
assuming the
existence of
Canadian rules
that conform to
SOX and an
exemption from
the SEC from
compliance
with SOX

54,540,000

460,062,986

7% Discount
Rate
683,134,611

10% Discount
Rate
614,395,265

409,880,767

368,637,159
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7. Conclusion
This report has found that MJDS offers significant savings to Canadian MJDS Issuers.
Our cost benefit results are sensitive to discount and upper and lower bound assumptions.
Our calculations reveal that the Net Present Value of aggregate cost savings to Canadian
MJDS Issuers for (a) using Forms F-9 and F-10 for U.S. public offerings; (b) using
MJDS forms for meeting U.S. annual disclosure obligations; and (c) from minimizing
lost “windows of opportunities”, ranges from US$1.6 billion to US$3 billion over a ten
year period, assuming a discount rate of 7%.
We find that the main savings of MJDS remain intact despite Canadian MJDS Issuers
being required to comply with SOX.
Our analysis reveals that the OSC’s Initiatives will impose additional costs on all
reporting issuers in Ontario that are not Canadian MJDS Issuers. However, the OSC’s
Initiatives will not impose additional costs on reporting issuers in Ontario that are
Canadian MJDS Issuers to the extent that the OSC’s Initiatives conform with SOX.
The Net Present Value of the external professional fees paid by Canadian issuers listed in
the U.S. to comply with SOX is estimated at U.S.$683 million over a ten-year period,
using a discount rate of seven percent. If Canadian Issuers listed in the U.S. were
exempted from compliance with SOX by the SEC and could instead comply with
Canadian rules that conform to SOX, this amount would drop to approximately U.S.$410
million, resulting in a cost savings of approximately U.S.$273 million.

29

Biographies of Authors
Poonam Puri
Poonam Puri is an Associate Professor of Law at Osgoode Hall Law School, York
University. She is a graduate of the University of Toronto Faculty of Law (LL.B. Silver
Medalist) and Harvard Law School (LL.M.). She articled at Torys and was a summer
associate at Paul, Weiss, Rifkind Wharton and Garrison in New York. Professor Puri’s
research focuses on corporate governance, corporate law, securities law, corporate and
white-collar crime, bankruptcy law, and law and economics. Professor Puri teaches
Corporate Governance, Advanced Securities Regulation, Business Associations, and
Markets and Institutions at Osgoode Hall Law School.
Professor Puri has analyzed the reforms arising in the U.S. from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002 and the made-in-Canada response to corporate governance reform. She was cochair (with Bill Braithwaite, Carol Hansell and Jim Turner) of an Osgoode Hall Law
School P.D.P. conference entitled Corporate Governance: Crisis and Reform held in the
fall of 2002, which explored these issues in detail. Professor Puri is co-author (with Doug
Harris, Ed Iacobucci, Ian Lee, Jeffrey MacIntosh, and Jacob Ziegel) of “Cases and
Materials on Partnerships and Canadian Business Corporations” (Toronto: Carswell,
forthcoming 2003). She is also co-editor (with Jeffrey Larsen) of “Corporate Governance
and Securities Regulation in a Post-Enron Era” (Toronto: Butterworths, forthcoming
2003). Professor Puri is currently working on a research report entitled “Local and
Regional Interests, Issues and Markets” through the Capital Markets Institute for the
recently appointed Wise Persons Committee.
Anindya Sen
Anindya Sen is an Assistant Professor of Economics at the University of Waterloo. After
completing his Ph.D. from the University of Toronto, he joined the Canadian
Competition Bureau as a staff economist. During that time he supervised and conducted
several econometric based analyses intended to assess the competitive effects of proposed
mergers and other potential anti-competitive actions by firms. Examples of these cases
include the proposed mergers between four of Canada’s five largest banks and alleged
collusion and price fixing by petroleum companies. He also acted as an expert witness on
behalf of the government, testifying at parliamentary committee hearings. After this, he
accepted a position as an Assistant Professor at the Department of Economics, University
of Waterloo where he continued his research in empirical industrial organization, public
finance and more recently, health economics. He has published his work in journals such
as the Journal of Law and Economics, Canadian Journal of Economics, and the Review
of Industrial Organization. Professor Sen ensured that the cost benefit analysis conducted
in this study adhered to established principles of public finance economics.

30

31

